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Abstract
A central tenet of constructivist models of conceptual development is that children’s initial con-
ceptual level constrains how they make sense of new evidence and thus whether exposure to evi-
dence will prompt conceptual change. Yet little experimental evidence directly examines this
claim for the case of sustained, fundamental conceptual achievements. The present study com-
bined scaling and experimental microgenetic methods to examine the processes underlying con-
ceptual change in the context of an important conceptual achievement of early childhood—the
development of a representational theory of mind. Results from 47 children (M age = 3.7 years)
indicate that only children who were conceptually close to understanding false belief at the begin-
ning of the study, and who were experimentally exposed to evidence of people acting on false
beliefs, reliably developed representational theories of minds. Combined scaling and microgenetic
data revealed how prior conceptual level interacts with experience, thereby providing critical
experimental evidence for how conceptual change results from the interplay between conceptions
and evidence.
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In developing evolutionary theory, a critical step in Darwin’s thinking came when the
numerous species and subspecies of mockingbirds on the Galapagos Islands led him to
realize that the idea of “fixity of species”—that species are fixed and stable over time—
was wrong. Darwin’s insights proceeded in a progression of ideas that unfolded over
years, but recognizing within-species change laid the groundwork for the major concep-
tual breakthroughs that came next—the ideas that new species can evolve and that the
mechanisms that drive within-species change and the origins of new species operate
on population-level variation—and thus the paradigm-shift that revolutionized modern
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biology. A process whereby preliminary conceptual insights lay the groundwork for para-
digm changes is seen throughout the history of science (Kuhn, 1962).
Potentially, a similar process might drive conceptual change in cognitive development.
According to both traditional (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) and modern constructivist (Xu,
2007) theories, children’s initial conceptual framework constrains how they make sense
of new evidence. For Piaget, children attempt to interpret new evidence within their cur-
rent conceptual framework (assimilation), making small modifications to cope with incon-
sistent data (accommodation), until they are prepared to adopt a new conceptual
framework (equilibration). In this view, it is not advances in child language or mental
age that are crucial for conceptual change, but the attainment of earlier conceptual
insights that provide the groundwork for making sense of new evidence.
Similarly, from the perspective of current rational models (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Grif-
fiths, & Goodman, 2011; Xu, 2007), learning involves the integration of new data with
children’s prior beliefs (constrained by a hypothesis space), with the product being both
the gradual updating of these prior beliefs—which then influence the interpretation of
new data—and when necessary, a revision of the underlying hypothesis space (Gopnik
et al., 2004). Consistent with this perspective, children’s prior beliefs constrain how they
learn from new statistical evidence (Schulz, Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Jenkins, 2008;
Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004; Teglas, 2011; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). For exam-
ple, children learned new causal relationships from statistical evidence more easily when
the evidence was consistent with their prior beliefs about the principles that underlie
physical causality (e.g., when the causes were spatially contiguous to the effects rather
than acting at a distance; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007). As another example, 3-year-olds
infer causal relations from statistical evidence more quickly when the causal relations are
consistent with their domain-specific na€ıve theories (e.g., they more easily learned biolog-
ical causes for biological effects than psychological causes for biological effects; Schulz,
Bonawitz, & Griffiths, 2007; see also, Sobel & Munro, 2009). Furthermore, developmen-
tal changes in children’s na€ıve theories of human action influence how 4- and 6-year-olds
use patterns of statistical co-variation to explain behavior (Seiver, Gopnik, & Goodman,
in press). Even when statistical evidence is inconsistent with children’s prior beliefs, how-
ever, preschool-age children are able to rationally update their beliefs if they are given
multiple training sessions over time (Bonawitz, Fisher, & Schulz, in press). Children’s
prior beliefs also constrain how they explore and understand new evidence in explor-
atory-play and question-asking tasks (Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz, 2012;
Legare, 2012). More generally, the importance of assessing children’s initial beliefs about
phenomena has been a common theme throughout the educational and developmental lit-
eratures (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).
Yet there has been surprisingly little experimental research examining these processes
as they unfold over time, as opposed to within one or two experimental sessions (for an
exception, see Bonawitz et al., 2012, where children participated in four sessions over the
course of 2 weeks), or with respect to fundamental conceptual changes that are more akin
to the paradigm changes in science described above. With respect to examining funda-
mental conceptual change over time, many cross-sectional studies have found that beliefs
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change as children get older, but almost none have both examined the effects of new evi-
dence experimentally and assessed progressions of conceptual change. Here, we examine
these processes in the context of a fundamental conceptual change that occurs in early
childhood—the development of a representational theory of mind.
Transition to a representational theory of mind, typically measured via a transition from
consistently failing to consistently passing explicit false belief (FB) tasks, provides an excel-
lent opportunity to test models of conceptual change for several reasons. First, the develop-
mental trajectory of this conceptual change in the preschool years is well established (for
meta-analysis, see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Second, although children show some
implicit understanding of FB in infancy (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon,
2009; Scott, Baillargeon, Song, & Leslie, 2010; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song, Onishi,
Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007), the development of an explicit
representational theory of mind in preschool remains an important conceptual achievement.
Indeed, the gap between infants’ implicit understanding of FB and the later development of
explicit FB concepts makes the development of theory of mind a particularly intriguing
developmental puzzle and highlights the importance of understanding the processes that
underlie conceptual development in this domain.
Third, preschool theory of mind developments, as indexed by FB developments, quali-
tatively change how children interact with their environment—much like the paradigm
changes discussed above. The central importance of the development of explicit FB con-
cepts in early childhood is underscored by its real-world implications; the ability to pass
explicit FB tasks in preschool is correlated with children’s popularity with peers (Peterson
& Siegal, 2002; Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002), teacher-rated social competence
(Astington, 2003; Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter, 2007; Watson, Nixon, Wilson, &
Capage, 1999), and skilled interactions with peers (Dunn, Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000),
including abilities to play games like hide and seek (Peskin & Ardino, 2003) and social
pretend play (Astington & Jenkins, 1995).
Fourth, the preschool change from consistently incorrect FB judgments to consistently
correct ones takes a year or more to accomplish in typically developing children (Well-
man et al., 2001). It thus constitutes not only an important change but also a developmen-
tally difficult one that generally requires sustained conceptual development.
Finally, and most important here, the series of conceptual insights that precede the
development of FB understanding can be measured via a theory of mind scale (Wellman
& Liu, 2004). This scale assesses understanding of (a) Diverse Desires (people can have
different desires); (b) Diverse Beliefs (people can have different beliefs); (c) Knowledge-
Access (a person will not have knowledge if he or she has not had access to the relevant
information); (d) FB (someone can believe something that is false); and (v) Hidden Emo-
tion (someone can feel one way but display a different emotion). In cross-sectional stud-
ies, typically developing children reliably proceed in order through this series of
understandings (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004) and change
from one step to the next requires 3–6 months to achieve. In this study, we experimen-
tally examine the role of these preliminary insights in the process of conceptual change
to a representational theory of mind.
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Although the transition from reliably incorrect to reliably correct FB performance gen-
erally takes approximately 1 year, prior research has developed several interventions that
facilitate and speed up the development of FB understanding in preschool-age children
(Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). Crucially, however, these
intervention studies also reveal substantial individual variation in improvement—some
children reliably passed FB at posttest, some showed moderate improvement, and some
continued to fail. For example, Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) compared several training
conditions with young preschoolers, all of whom failed FB at pretest. In the most suc-
cessful condition, average performance on three FB tasks substantially improved after
training; however, even at posttest, individual children’s scores ranged from 0 to 3 (simi-
lar variation was reported by Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006). Why do some children
develop an understanding of FB following such interventions while others, exposed to the
same evidence, do not? This question is fundamental to any theoretical account of the
nature of cognitive change.
The possibility that we examine is that children’s learning in such interventions is con-
strained by their previous level of conceptual understanding. That is, that children who
are conceptually closer to developing an understanding of FB (i.e., as indicated by their
position along the theory of mind scale) will have the prior knowledge that will enable
them to make sense of the new evidence presented to them during the study, and thus
that this new evidence will prompt conceptual change for these children. In contrast, chil-
dren who are initially farther away from developing an understanding of FB will not have
the requisite prior knowledge to make sense of the new evidence. In this way, we test
whether prior knowledge both constrains and enables children’s ability to learn from new
evidence, in the context of a fundamental, sustained conceptual achievement of early
childhood. To test these hypotheses, we recruited a group of children who had not yet
developed an understanding of FB, but who varied from one another on the extent to
which they had developed prior conceptual understandings. Using the theory of mind
scale as our context, we predicted that those who already understood Knowledge Access
(KA)—the level that reliably precedes FB understanding in scaling research—would
develop an understanding of FB over the course of an extended training period, whereas
those who had not yet developed an understanding of KA—but were exposed to the same
training sessions—would not. These predictions and the present research help address the
fundamental theoretical question of how to characterize cognitive change; in our case,
change to a representational theory of mind.
Our methods combined scaling methods with a microgenetic training study. Microge-
netic methods rest on fine-grained analyses of cognitive change over multiple successive
sessions to provide a rich picture of development and learning as it unfolds (Siegler,
2006; Siegler & Crowley, 1992). Although microgenetic methods have most often been
used to examine skill or strategy acquisition (e.g., Luwel, Siegler, & Verschaffel, 2008;
Siegler & Chen, 1998; Siegler & Stern, 1998; Siegler & Svetina, 2006), they can also be
fruitfully applied to conceptual development (e.g., Opfer & Siegler, 2004, 2007). Our
microgenetic methods were inspired by Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006), but critically,
we combined this approach with an assessment of children’s initial position along the
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progression of conceptual insights captured by the theory of mind scale. We included suf-
ficient children to model variation in children’s progress and attainment of FB under-
standing. Our microgenetic method differs from a focused training study (e.g., Lohmann
& Tomasello, 2003), in that children receive no explicit teaching about FB concepts.
Instead, children see people acting in accordance with FBs (evidence that is inconsistent
with a non-representational theory of mind), and we assess whether and how this evi-
dence prompts the development of a representational theory of mind.
1. Methods
1.1. Participants
Participants included 47 children, assigned to Experimental (n = 29, 15 male, M
age = 3.77 years) or Control (n = 18, eight male, M age = 3.76 years) conditions,
recruited from private preschools in a midsize city in the midwestern United States. The
larger sample in the Experimental condition reflects our primary aim of testing whether
children’s initial understanding of KA predicted their development of an understanding of
FB given microgenetic experiences. Our Control condition (described below) also
included children who both did and did not already understand KA, to confirm that initial
understanding of KA did not lead to an understanding of FB during the course of the
experiment simply due to the passage of time (instead of due to the evidence received
during the microgenetic sessions). Thus, previous understanding of KA should predict
whether children develop an understanding of FB in the Experimental condition, but not
in the Control condition.
1.2. Pretest and posttest measures
To establish that children did not yet have an understanding of FB and to identify their
initial conceptual level, all children completed a pretest battery and then completed the
same battery at posttest (approximately 8 weeks later). These measures included the five
tasks of the theory of mind scale developed by Wellman and Liu (2004; outlined earlier).
The scale includes a Contents FB task (children predict whether an agent will think that
a box contains its true contents or the contents suggested by its appearance). Children
also completed two additional FB tasks: a FB-self task (children report what they previ-
ously thought a crayon box contained—crayons or a toy—before they looked inside and
found a toy) and a FB-location task (children predict where a character will search for an
object—where he left it or in a new location—after the object was moved while the char-
acter was not looking). Children were excluded from the final sample if they passed more
than one of the three FB tasks (or if they passed one FB task and one of three other
related tasks; see the Data S1); 96 children completed pretest measures, 49 were excluded
because they (a) passed more than one FB task at pretest, (b) had no consent for partici-
pation beyond pre-testing, or (c) left their preschool prior to study completion.
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1.3. Microgenetic sessions
Children in the Experimental condition (n = 29) completed 6 weeks of microgenetic
sessions between the pretest and posttest, with two sessions per week. Children in the
Control condition had no microgenetic sessions; they completed only the pretest and post-
test measures at the same time interval as children in the Experimental condition. In each
session, children completed two FB tasks, which varied in form (FB-contents or FB-loca-
tions) and presentation (shown in storybooks or acted out with props). Each task pre-
sented new characters and scenarios, but all followed the same structure. First, children
were asked to predict the thoughts or behavior of an agent who had an FB, as in a
standard FB task. Following the child’s prediction, however, children were shown the
outcome, in which the agent acted based on his or her FB. For example, children pre-
dicted whether an agent who had not seen inside a playdoh can say there was playdoh
inside (an action based on a FB) or a bouncy ball inside (an action based on reality).
After the child’s prediction (children who do not yet understand FB predict that the agent
will say there is a ball), the experimenter described the outcome (e.g., “Sammy says there
is playdoh inside!”). Thus, across the 12 sessions, children were exposed to 24 scenarios
where agents acted based on FBs. As all children began the experiment without an under-
standing of FB, they received 24 pieces of evidence that were inconsistent with their ini-
tial theories. For analyses, children received a “1” each time they predicted an action
based on an FB and a “0” each time they predicted an action based on reality.
To help children focus on the discrepancies between their initial theories and the
agents’ actions, children were also asked to explain the agents’ behaviors (a sample script
is available in the Data S1); 17 children were asked for explanations on every trial and
12 were asked every four trials. There were no differences based on this factor at pretest
or posttest for scale-level or percentages of passed FB trials (ps > .15). Thus, all children
were considered as a single experimental group (n = 29). Two independent raters coded
children’s explanations (see Table 1). Inter-rater agreement was excellent (92%).
1.3.1. True belief
Every second microgenetic session, children answered one story involving true beliefs,
to help them resist any expectation that all tasks had some sort of “trick” and to track
whether increases in FB accuracy occurred at the expense of general accuracy (which
Table 1
Coding categories for children’s explanations
Explanation Examples
Belief “He doesn’t know there is a ball in there” “He thinks there is
playdoh in there, but there isn’t”
Mistake “He made a mistake”
Desire “He wants playdoh.” “He loves to play with playdoh”
Situational “There’s no playdoh there.” “It moved away”
Don’t know (or no response) “I don’t know”
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could result in true belief decrements). For example, children saw a juice carton, which
contained juice, and were asked to predict what a character would think was inside. There
was 96% accuracy on True Belief trials.
2. Results
2.1. Posttest FB understanding
Our key prediction was that children whose initial conceptual level placed them closer
to FB understanding would be more likely to develop an understanding of FB following
exposure to relevant evidence. Thus, children who passed KA at pretest (the conceptual
level immediately preceding FB) and were in the experimental group (and thus exposed
to relevant evidence) should be most likely to develop FB understanding. We conducted
a binomial regression predicting the number of FB trials passed at posttest, with age as a
continuous predictor and condition (experimental, control) and pretest-KA as categorical
predictors. As predicted, within the experimental condition, children who passed pretest-
KA passed more FB trials at posttest than children who failed pretest-KA, p < .001,
whereas within the control condition, children who passed and failed pretest-KA did not
differ from each other (Fig. 1). The Condition * KA interaction was reliable, Wald
v2(1) = 6.98, p = .008, as was the overall model, Likelihood ratio v2 = 44.07, p < .001.
Performance on FB at posttest also improved with age, Wald v2(1) = 7.51, p = .006,
OR = 3.85. Comparing the standardized deviance estimates across successive models
Fig. 1. The probability of passing a false belief task at posttest, with 95% confidence intervals, by condition
and whether children passed the knowledge access task at pretest. At pretest, 28 children failed knowledge
access (KA) (17 experimental, 11 control) and 19 passed KA (12 experimental, seven control).
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(first including only age, then adding condition, then pretest-KA, and finally the condition
* pretest-KA interaction) confirmed that each successive model had improved fit,
ps < .01. Across the sample, only nine children passed all three indicators of FB under-
standing at posttest (17 passed 0; 21 passed 1 or 2). All nine were in the experimental
condition and had passed KA at pretest.
We re-ran this analysis focusing only on the 29 children in the experimental condition,
including an indicator of verbal fluency as an additional control variable. Verbal fluency
was assessed by tallying average explanation lengths—the number of words a child used
per explanation within their 12 microgenetic sessions (M = 4.08 words, range .83–9.50).
The overall model was again significant, Likelihood ratio v2(3) = 33.74, p < .001. As
above, controlling for age and verbal fluency, children who passed KA at pretest passed
significantly more FB trials at posttest (M = .77, CI = 0.57, 0.90) than those who failed
KA at pretest (M = .36, CI = 0.22, 0.53), Wald v2 (1) = 8.44, p = .004, OR = 5.96. Age
increased the likelihood of passing FB trials at posttest, Wald v2(1) = 5.53, p = .02,
OR = 4.32, but there was no effect of verbal fluency.
2.2. Microgenetic sessions
2.2.1. False-belief judgments
Children in the Experimental condition received multiple FB tasks during the microge-
netic sessions. Children improved on these FB judgments and therefore accumulated
increasing successful experience with FB understanding. Children’s prior theory of mind
understanding, as indexed by pretest-KA, predicted this within-session improvement (see
Fig. 2). The cumulative number of correct FB judgments differed consistently and pro-
gressively by whether children initially passed KA. A 2 (Pretest-KA: Pass, Fail) X 12
Fig. 2. The average cumulative numbers of correct false-belief (FB) judgments plotted session-by-session
across the microgenetic sessions, by whether children passed the knowledge access task at pretest, for chil-
dren in the experimental condition. The number plotted at session 1 shows the correct FB judgments in ses-
sion 1, the plot for session 6 shows total correct FB summed across sessions 1 through 6, and so on.
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(Sessions 1–12) repeated measures analysis of variance confirmed the depicted time *
pretest-KA interaction, F(11, 297) = 10.44, p < .001, g² = .28. Although both pretest KA
failers and passers began by making consistent FB errors, with increasing microgenetic
experience, pretest KA passers dramatically increased in FB accuracy. This increase was
not at the expense of overall accuracy, as children maintained 96% accuracy on true
belief tasks with near ceiling performance across all sessions. Accumulating microgenetic
accuracy carried over into posttest; the number of FB trials that children passed during
the sessions strongly predicted how many they passed on the posttest, r = .80, p < .001.
2.2.2. Explanations
During microgenetic sessions, experimental children provided explanations of the char-
acters’ mistaken actions (based on the character’s contrary-to-reality beliefs). Passing KA
at pretest also affected these explanations. Situational explanations, which overlook the
role of mental states in understanding the agents’ behaviors, were given more often dur-
ing their microgenetic sessions by children who failed pretest-KA (M = 42.69%,
SD = 27.98%) than children who passed (M = 22.25%, SD = 20.59%), t(27) = 2.15,
p = .04. In contrast, children who passed pretest-KA were more likely to give belief-
based explanations (M = 21.26%, SD = 23.44%) than children who failed (M = 6.85%,
SD = 20.76%). No other explanation type varied by initial level of KA.
2.3. Change in ToM scale score from pretest to posttest
Table 2 shows the numbers of children demonstrating each pattern on the scale at pre-
test and posttest. The percent of children passing the various scale tasks conforms to the
expected scale sequence (Wellman & Liu, 2004). A 2 (Time: pretest, posttest) x 2 (Con-
dition: experimental, control) repeated measures ANOVA on scale scores (0–5 for total
tasks passed) indicated children’s scale scores rose over time (M pretest = 2.19, SE = .10,
M posttest = 2.64, SE = .19), F(1, 29) = 5.45, p = .03, g² = .16. Binomial regression
models confirmed that being in the experimental condition did not influence the odds of
passing any step on the scale at posttest, aside from FB (reported in the prior analyses).
Thus, there were no effects of condition, ps > .25, in this overall analysis of scale scores.
Table 2
Number of children receiving each scale score at pretest and posttesta
Passed Number of Children at Pretest Number of Children at Posttest
Nothing 1 0
DD only 4 6
DD and DB 20 9
DD, DB, and KA 11 9
DD, DB, KA, and FB 0 10
Other 11 13
aThe frequencies of each scale score did not vary by condition at pretest, p > .80 or posttest, p > .29.
DB, diverse beliefs; DD, diverse desires; FB, false belief; KA, knowledge access.
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3. Discussion
Children’s initial conceptual level determined whether and how new evidence pro-
voked conceptual change. Specifically, understanding KA (or not) substantially predicted
whether microgenetic exposure to relevant evidence provoked transition to an understand-
ing of FB. Initial conceptual level and the passage of time alone did not provoke this
change, as control children who initially understood KA did not develop an understanding
of FB. Exposure to evidence alone was also not sufficient, as experimental children who
did not initially understand KA also did not develop an understanding of FB. Age was
associated with improved understanding of FB, but conceptual change was predicted by
the interaction between initial understanding of KA and experimental exposure to relevant
evidence, controlling for age.
These data go beyond other studies that have examined the influence of children’s
prior beliefs on conceptual learning, by examining learning processes as they unfold over
time (12 sessions over 6 weeks, as opposed to within a single experimental session).
Also, we examined conceptual development with respect to a fundamental conceptual
change that prior research has established as an extended and difficult developmental
accomplishment; namely, preschool transition to a representational theory of mind. More-
over, we tracked not only children’s increased accuracy on FB alone, but their progres-
sion along a reliable sequence of preschool theory of mind understandings.
The present data are consistent with the proposal that the development of ToM
involves a series of domain-specific conceptual changes. Although these findings do not
preclude the possibility that factors external to a conceptual domain—such as children’s
general processing skills, engagement, inhibitory control, or memory—importantly con-
tribute to conceptual change, the present data suggest that these abilities do not fully
account for theory of mind development for several reasons. First, if the Experimental
condition supported the development of FB understanding by facilitating these general
abilities, it is unclear why it would do so only for children who had previously developed
an understanding of KA. Yet children’s initial conceptual understanding demonstratively
enabled and constrained their potential to learn from new evidence. That is, given the
same extended microgenetic experiences, children’s prior understandings both enabled
learning (for children closer to FB on the theory of mind scale at pretest) and constrained
it (for those further away to begin with). Second, we found that our measure of verbal
fluency did not predict whether children in the Experimental condition developed an
understanding of FB. In future work, it would be useful to include more extensive mea-
sures of executive functioning and memory to examine more fully the contribution of
these factors in shaping children’s conceptual development in this context.
It is worth considering why prior understanding of KA, in particular, enabled progress
to FB understanding in our study. We speculate that understanding the relationship
between perceptual access and resulting mental states, early acquired in the case of
understanding KA, enables recognition of the role of perceptual evidence in belief
formation as well (and this also explains why KA reliably precedes FB understanding in
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cross-sectional and longitudinal theory of mind scaling research, e.g., Wellman, Fang, &
Peterson, 2011). Neither understanding Diverse Desires nor Diverse Beliefs requires
appreciation of how mental states depend on perceptual experience. Others have specu-
lated on the formative role of understanding perceptual access as a conceptual “prior” for
understanding FB evidence (see Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Our data underwrite further
research to address this specific hypothesis.
The current data provide clear support for a basic, but often unexamined, premise of
constructivist models of cognitive development—that conceptual development involves the
successful building of new insights through an active process of evidence interpretation, consis-
tent with current rational models (Goodman et al., 2006; Ullman, Goodman, & Tenenbaum,
2010). Our data clearly manifest two empirical signatures of such a process of conceptual
development: (a) that prior conceptual knowledge influences whether exposure to new evidence
results in conceptual change and (b) that learning proceeds in orderly conceptual progressions.
Our data evidence these features in extended, sustained childhood learning of demonstrably dif-
ficult, everyday concepts. Thus, these data also illustrate the usefulness of combining scaling
and microgenetic methods to empirically capture processes of conceptual change.
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